By Atty. Jeremiah Samuel Dugbo, I.
Abstract:
This article interrogates a recent Supreme Court decision (In Re: Contempt Proceedings against Justin Oldpa Yeazehn) sentencing a social media commentator to six months imprisonment for contempt of court arising from insulting statements directed at members of the judiciary and the mother of the Chief Justice. In addition to imprisonment, the Court ordered that the contemnor file a behavior bond guaranteeing that he would refrain from insulting any Liberian citizen in the future. While the Court’s decision appears motivated by a desire to protect the institutional dignity of the Liberian Judiciary and public order, this article argues that the ruling raises profound constitutional concerns. Specifically, the judgment risks violating the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression, undermining proportionality in punishment, and extending judicial authority into impermissible prior restraint. The article concludes that the long-term legitimacy of the judiciary depends less on coercive power and more on constitutional restraint.
I. Introduction:
The contempt power is one of the judiciary’s most potent instruments. It exists to preserve the authority of courts, maintain order in proceedings, and ensure the effective administration of justice. Yet history demonstrates that this power, when exercised without restraint, may threaten the very constitutional order it seeks to protect.A recent Supreme Court decision in the case In Re: Contempt Proceedings against Justin Oldpa Yeazehn presents a vivid illustration of this tension. In the aforementioned case, an online commentator, Justin Oldman Yeazehn, widely known as “Prophet Key” was sentenced to six months imprisonment for contempt after publicly accusing members of the judiciary of corruption and directing offensive language toward the mother of the Chief Justice. More controversially, the Court ordered that upon completion of his sentence, the contemnor must file a behavior bond guaranteeing that he would refrain from insulting any Liberian citizen or public official in the future.This article does not defend vulgar speech, nor does it diminish the importance of judicial dignity. Instead, for scholarly purpose, it interrogates whether the Court’s response exceeded constitutional limits. It advances three central arguments. First, the decision risks violating the constitutional protection of freedom of speech. Second, the severity of the punishment appears disproportionate relative to comparable statutory offenses. Third, the behavior bond requirement constitutes a form of prior restraint and therefore represents a troubling expansion of judicial authority.
II. The Constitutional and Doctrinal Context of ContemptContempt of court traditionally falls into two categories:
civil contempt, designed to compel compliance with court orders, and criminal contempt, intended to punish conduct that threatens the administration of justice. In re Scott and Roberts; 32 LLR 313 (1984); In re: Contempt Proceeding against Flomo, 40 LLR 575 (6 July 2001. In both forms, the power is justified not by the personal interests of judges or justices but by the institutional need to protect the functioning of the courts. Title 17, Chapter 12, section 12.5 of the New Judiciary Law treats contempt as acts that tend to undermine or obstruct the court or judiciary in the administration of justice. It is undisputed that the Constitution of Liberia recognizes contempt of court as a power inherently delegated to the judiciary. Chapter VII, Article 74, Cont., 1986 However, constitutional democracies impose limits on this power. Courts are not insulated from public criticism. Indeed, public scrutiny is an essential feature of accountable governance. The constitutional protection of freedom of speech and expression reflects the recognition that democratic institutions must remain open to challenge, dissent, and even harsh criticism.In this context, contempt sanctions based purely on offensive speech must be scrutinized carefully. The central question is whether the speech in question obstructed justice or merely offended judicial sensibilities.
III. Freedom of Speech and Expression and the Limits of Judicial Sensitivity:
It is my considered position that Article 15 of the Constitution of Liberia secures not merely abstract freedom of expression, but the concrete right of citizens to criticize public officials and state institutions. In a constitutional democracy, this protection is not incidental; it embodies the foundational principle that those entrusted with public authority must necessarily endure a greater degree of scrutiny, dissent, and even harsh criticism than private individuals, since accountability to the people is the very condition upon which legitimate governance rests.While insults may be socially undesirable, constitutional protection does not extend only to polite speech. Democracies protect robust, uncomfortable, and even offensive expression because the alternative risks suppressing political accountability. In his dissent in the case Terminiello v. Chicago (1949), Justice Douglas of the US Supreme Court argues that “a function of free speech under our system of government [democracy] is to invite dispute… It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger”. This position has been adopted in modern jurisprudence. Most recently, the Supreme Court of the United States reinforced that speech cannot be punished merely because it is disturbing or emotionally harmful unless it meets the strict legal threshold of a “true threat.” Counterman v. Colorado (2023); Moody v. NetChoice (2024); 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis (2023). The true test of free speech is whether it poses a clear and present danger. The Court has held repeatedly that the danger must be imminent—a true threat or incitement to imminent violence—not perceived or speculative. Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969); Hess v. Indiana (1973); Schenck v. United States (1919). The controlling principle in constitutional free-speech jurisprudence is not limited to speech that threatens violence; it extends more fundamentally to the protection of expression that is offensive, unpopular, or unsettling. Democratic constitutional orders recognize that the legitimacy of public institutions depends upon allowing citizens to voice harsh, irreverent, or even distasteful criticism of those who exercise state authority. Article 15 of the Constitution of Liberia must therefore be understood as safeguarding not only agreeable or polite expression, but also speech that provokes discomfort or indignation. The question in the present matter is thus not whether the words were courteous, but whether they crossed the narrow constitutional boundary where expression ceases to be protected and becomes punishable. Nothing in the record suggests that the statement of February 2, 2026 produced disorder, obstructed the administration of justice, or created any demonstrable harm prior to the contemnor’s first appearance on February 10, 2026. Absent such showing, the sanction risks resting on the impermissible ground that the speech was merely offensive — a basis inconsistent with the very purpose of constitutional free expression. Just like the judiciary, the legislature also has inherent contempt power, as enshrined in Article 44 of the Liberian Constitution. The Supreme Court of Liberia, interpreting the inherent contempt power of the legislature, reemphasized in Morlu, II v. House of the Senate, decided on June 28, 2008, that contempt of the legislature requires an obstruction or interference with legislative functions or obstruction or impediment of members or officers of the Legislature in the discharge of their legislative duties. The same standard applies to the judicial branch in that for contempt to lie, the act or conduct of the contemnor must interfere with or obstruct the administration of justice. In re Scott and Roberts; 32 LLR 313 (1984), Syl.2.The Supreme Court of Liberia enunciated definitively that “in striking a balance between freedom of speech and press and the administration of justice, the line is fixed at that point where that which is spoken or published is calculated to obstruct the functioning processes of the court. “Obstructing the administration of justice by the courts through speech or press is an abuse of those liberties, such as will subject the person to punishment” paraphrase ” In re Cllr. Abayomi Cassell; 28 LLR 107 (1979), Syl. 28In the case under consideration, there’s no showing that the commentator’s speech, though offensive, disrupts court proceedings, interferes with, or impedes judicial functions. The harm, therefore, appears reputational rather than institutional. While the averments of the contempt proceedings encompassed both a denunciation of the judiciary on allegations of corruption and the use of profanities at the Chief Justice’s mother, the Court’s holding, reasoning, and judgment are conspicuously silent and instead rest squarely on invectives directed at the Chief Justice’s mother and by extension the womanhood of all women, especially Liberian women. Does the law of contempt of court in Liberia encompass the protection of women’s rights? I think not. Punishing such speech with imprisonment risks transforming contempt into a tool for protecting personal dignity rather than safeguarding judicial process. Moreover, harsh contempt sanctions for criticism may produce a chilling effect. Citizens may become reluctant to question judicial conduct, thereby weakening public oversight of the courts. Ironically, this may erode the legitimacy the Court sought to defend.V. Proportionality and the Problem of Excessive PunishmentThe constitutional order requires that punishment be proportionate to the offense. Even where contempt is established, sanctions must reflect the actual harm caused.In Liberia’s criminal law framework, verbal insults typically fall within offenses such as disorderly conduct, which attract relatively modest penalties. A six-month custodial sentence therefore appears severe when compared with analogous statutory violations. Chapter 17, captioned “Offenses against Public Order”, section 17.3(1) of the Penal law of Liberia, as amended, states: “A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance oralarm or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: a)engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior; or (b)makes unreasonable noise or offensively coarse utterance; gesture, or display, or addresses abusive language to any person present; or (c)creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor.”Chapter 50, Section 50.2(1) of ‘An Act to amend Title 26 of the Liberian Code of Law Revised, Penal Law Chapter 50 Relating To Sentencing and Related Matters’ reclassifies this offense as a third -degree misdemeanor and in Chapter 50, Section 50.7(c) of the aforesaid law, it imposes a definite term of imprisonment to be fixed by court at no more than 30 days. Similarly, Title 17, Chapter 12, Section 12.6 of the New Judiciary Law of Liberia, as amended, provides in pertinent part that …“punishment for criminal contempt may be by fine, not exceeding $300 in the Supreme Court or by imprisonment not exceeding 30 days”…Notably, Chapter VII, Article 74 of the Constitution of Liberia mandates that “In all matters of contempt of court, whether in the Supreme Court or in other courts, the penalties to be imposed shall be fixed by the Legislature and shall conform to the provisions on Fundamental Rights laid down in this Constitution.” Although the Judiciary Law was enacted in 1972, prior to the adoption of the 1986 Constitution, its continued application by the courts demonstrates its survival as part of the body of laws preserved by the constitutional order. Its invocation by the Supreme Court in In re: Contempt Proceedings against Mr. Rodney Sieh (Jan. 21, 2011) confirms that the statute remains a governing legal framework rather than a relic of a prior regime. In that case, the Court, having found Mr. Sieh guilty of contempt, imposed a structured sanction consisting of a fine of US$300 payable within twenty-four hours, a conditional term of imprisonment of thirty days, and an order requiring publication of an apology. The Court’s reliance on the Judiciary Law as operative authority in 2011 underscores its recognition as prevailing law. Against that background, the present departure in both reasoning and penalty invites scrutiny, as it raises the question whether the Court has articulated a principled basis for distinguishing the earlier precedent or has instead departed from an established framework without justification. When contempt penalties exceed those provided by the Constitution, the Court itself, including legislation for similar conduct, courts risk circumventing constitutional, statutory and common law safeguards and assuming quasi-legislative authority. Such outcomes threaten the principle of stare decisis and the theory of legality (often expressed in the legal maxim nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege) that punishment must be defined and constrained by law, not judicial discretion alone.The excessive severity of the sentence may thus undermine both constitutional proportionality and the separation of powers as prescribed in chapter III, article 21(c) ii and chapter I, article 3 & chapter VII, article 74, respectively of the Liberian constitution, 1986. Others may be tempted to term it a blatant violation of human rights or abuse of judicial powerV. The Behavior Bond as Prior RestraintBehavior bond also known as sureties for good behavior were imposed where a person’s conduct posed a risk to public order; they were meant to prevent violence, breaches of the peace, or intimidation; they were not designed to silence political criticism or opinion.In theory, they regulated dangerous conduct, not speech. So historically, they served a public-order function, not a censorship function. See 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 251–52 (1769). The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that: Prior restraints are presumptively unconstitutional; courts cannot silence speech merely because it is offensive or critical. For example, in Near v. Minnesota, the Court held that suppressing future publications is the “essence of censorship.”Perhaps the most constitutionally troubling aspect of the judgment and opinion of the Supreme Court is the requirement that the contemnor, “Prophet Key”, guarantee he will not insult any Liberian citizen in the future as a precondition for his release.This order effectively regulates future speech rather than addressing past conduct. In constitutional jurisprudence, such restrictions are typically classified as prior restraints. Prior restraint is defined as “a governmental restriction on speech or publication before its actual expression.” Black’s Law Dictionary (Bryan A. Garner ed., 10th ed. abridged 2014). Prior restraints are widely regarded as among the most suspect forms of state action because they suppress expression without reference to specific future wrongdoing.The breadth of the order compounds the concern. It extends beyond the judiciary and beyond the case itself, covering speech directed at any citizen. Such a sweeping prohibition appears disconnected from the legitimate purposes of contempt law and functions of the judiciary.In effect, the Court assumed a role closer to that of a moral regulator than an adjudicator of legal disputes. This raises serious questions about the limits of judicial authority and the importance of institutional self-restraint. The Liberian Supreme Court historically considers, consistent with judicial tenets, post-publication sanctions, not pre-publication suppression. In re: Albert Porte, et al. January 1975; In re: Contempt Proceedings against Mr. Rodney Sieh, January 2011; The order of the Honorable Supreme Court best fits a judicial overreach and undermines Chapter III, Article 15 (b) of the Constitution, which guarantees that the “right of freedom of expression encompasses the right to hold opinions without interference.”
VI. Conclusion:
The recent contempt decision illustrates the persistent tension between institutional authority and constitutional liberty. Courts must protect their processes, but that protection must remain anchored in constitutional limits and principled restraint. Judicial authority ultimately depends on legitimacy, and legitimacy is sustained when courts show tolerance for criticism and fidelity to law.Contempt sanctions should therefore be confined to speech that demonstrably interferes with the administration of justice. Where expression is merely offensive, measured responses better preserve both judicial credibility and constitutional freedom. Restrictions on future speech must also be narrowly justified, lest they erode the democratic values the courts exist to uphold.In a constitutional democracy, criticism of the Judiciary, even when intemperate, is unavoidable. A court that endures such criticism affirms its strength, while one that suppresses it risks diminishing its moral authority. The rule of law is best preserved when courts protect both their processes and the freedoms from which their legitimacy flows.
